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I. INTRODUCTION
To have standing in a civil antitrust action under the Clayton Act,1
plaintiffs must meet a more demanding standard than the constitutional 
case or controversy requirement; plaintiffs must also establish antitrust 
injury and that they are an efficient enforcer.2 But what is an efficient 
1 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
2 Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 770 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Port 
Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle, NE., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 
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enforcer? This question has confounded civil antitrust litigation for 
decades. Unfortunately, the answer to this question continues to elude.
Compounding the problem, the recent financial products benchmark 
antitrust litigation attempts to apply a rule primarily designed for non-
financial product vertical chains of distribution to benchmark 
manipulation cases where the direct purchaser is less likely to incur 
damages. This paper attempts to clarify the efficient enforcer rule and 
to argue that it is not applicable to antitrust benchmark manipulation 
cases.
The case law addressing the efficient enforcer rule is discussed in 
§ II below. Generally, the efficient enforcer rule asks the question, 
“does an indirect purchaser who purchases goods or services from a 
middleman, who purchased from defendants who are allegedly 
engaging in antitrust violations, have standing to sue defendants in a 
civil antitrust action?” Specifically, the efficient enforcer rule 
addresses the problems of duplicative recovery and complex 
apportionment of damages in cases involving indirect purchasers and 
balancing these concerns with the concern that denying recovery 
would allow those who violated antitrust laws to retain illegal profits.
The problems of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment are 
particularly apparent in cases where the alleged antitrust violation 
caused a price increase which is passed-on by a middleman to indirect 
purchasers in the typical vertical chain of distribution. Unfortunately, 
as applied by some courts, the efficient enforcer rule has been 
conflated with antitrust injury issues, sometimes morphed into a no 
indirect purchaser rule and virtually ignores the deterrence concerns 
regarding antitrust violators keeping illegal profits.
Recently, there have been numerous cases addressing antitrust 
violations due to defendants’ manipulation of financial products 
benchmarks. This paper examines three of these financial product 
benchmark cases: In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust 
Litigation (LIBOR); 3 In re Foreign Exchange Antitrust Litigation
U.S. 519, 534 n.31 (1983)). See Derek M. Gillis, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer 
Liability - Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Cannot Use Pass-on Defense in Antitrust 
Suits Brought by Pharmacies — Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, (Cal. 
2010), 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 373, 378 n.25 (2011) (citing LOUIS ALTMAN &
MALLA POLLACK, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND 
MONOPOLIES § 4.49 (4th ed. 2010) (citing Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority, 
921 F.2d 1438, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991)).
3 In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11-mdl-2262, 2016 WL 
7378980 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016).
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(FOREX);4 and Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Bank of America 
Corp (ISDAfix). 5 As discussed in § III below, financial products 
benchmarks provide a mechanism to set prices, or components of 
prices, for certain financial products. In financial products benchmark 
cases there is no pass-on, nor are we dealing with a typical vertical 
chain of distribution. More to the point, the manipulation of the 
financial products benchmarks does not produce the likelihood of 
duplicative damages or complex apportionment. Most courts 
addressing the issue of efficient enforcer in financial products 
benchmark cases recognized this fact. However, we still are seeing 
confusion regarding the efficient enforcer rule in these cases. 
II. WHAT IS AN EFFICIENT ENFORCER?
The efficient enforcer rule is derived from civil antitrust cases 
attempting to decide what class of plaintiffs have standing to proceed 
with their action. 6 As indicated above, indirect purchasers in the 
typical vertical chain of distribution where the increased cartel price 
was passed-on through the vertical chain of distribution created a 
problem of duplicative recovery and complex apportionment. The 
Supreme Court’s efficient enforcer opinions address duplicative 
recovery, complex apportionment of damages, and balancing these 
4 In re Foreign Exchange Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 
2015).
5 Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Bank of America Corp., 175 F. Supp. 3d 44 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016). Additional cases include: In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., 
Antitrust Litig., Nos. 14-md-2573, 14-mc-2573, 2018 WL 3585277 at *12–17
(S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2018) (while plaintiffs were efficient enforcers regarding 
defendant banks involved in the Silver Fix benchmark, In re London Silver Fixing, 
Ltd., Antitrust Litig., 213 F. Supp. 3d 530, 552–57 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2016), 
plaintiffs were not efficient enforcers regarding defendants who were non-fixing 
banks due to plaintiffs being umbrella purchasers vis-à-vis non-fixing banks, which 
diminishes the directness of the injury, more direct victims were available, 
damages would be more speculative regarding the non-fixing banks and the 
probability of duplicative recover and apportionment problems). A similar 
distinction between fixing banks and non-fixing banks was found in In re
Commodity Exch., Inc., Gold Futures and Options Trading Litig. Nos. 14-md-
2548, 14-mc-2548, 2018 WL 3585276 at *5–9 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2018) (plaintiffs 
failed to state an antitrust claim vis-à-vis non-fixing banks), and In re Commodity 
Exch., Inc., Gold Futures and Options Trading Litig., 213 F. Supp. 3d 631, 652–60
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2016) (some plaintiffs are efficient enforcers vis-à-vis fixing 
banks).
6 Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust 
Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 813–40 (1977).
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considerations with concerns regarding allowing defendants to keep 
illegal profits.7 In determining whether there is a danger of duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment, the Supreme Court has 
articulated factors to consider including causation, the existence of 
more direct victims, the highly speculative nature of the damages 
sought, and the risk of duplicative damages.8
As summarized below, the Supreme Court factors for determining 
if there is a potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment for the efficient enforcer analysis has been conflated by 
appellate courts with another standing requirement; antitrust injury.
Further, in some jurisdictions, an oversimplified “no indirect 
purchaser” rule9 has been articulated. The result is confused analysis 
and the danger of false negatives for civil antitrust cases. The solution 
to this problem is to apply the efficient enforcer factors to the Supreme 
Court’s articulated efficient enforcer considerations; duplicative 
recovery, complex apportionment of damages, and balancing these 
considerations with concerns regarding allowing defendants to keep 
illegal profits.
A. Supreme Court Decisions on Efficient Enforcement
The first Supreme Court decision to pronounce the principle of 
“efficient enforcement” was the 1968 decision of Hanover Shoe, Inc. 
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. (Hanover).10 In Hanover, a manufacturer 
of shoes alleged a Sherman § 2, monopolization, violation against 
United Shoe Machinery Corporation (United) a manufacturer and 
distributor of shoe manufacturing machinery. In a related antitrust 
case, United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States (United), 11 the 
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment against United for
monopolization based, in part, on a rental rather than sale policy for 
the shoe machinery. Relying on the Supreme Court’s finding of 
monopolization in United, Hanover claimed it had been damaged in 
an amount reflecting the difference it paid in rental rather than the 
purchase of the equipment.
7 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Associated Gen., 459 U.S. 
519; Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982); Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 
431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 
481 (1968). 
8 Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 532–35.
9 One who has not purchased directly from the alleged antitrust violator(s).
10 Hanover, 392 U.S. at 481.
11 United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); 15 U.S.C. § 2 
(2012).
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United argued that Hanover was not damaged because Hanover 
passed-on the additional costs to its customers. The Court rejected this 
“pass-on” defense articulating an early “efficient enforcer” rule:
In addition, if buyers are subjected to the passing-on defense, 
those who buy from them would also have to meet the 
challenge that they passed on the higher price to their 
customers. These ultimate consumers, in today's case the 
buyers of single pairs of shoes, would have only a tiny stake in 
a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action. In 
consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws by price-
fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality 
because no one was available who would bring suit against 
them.12
This articulation of efficient enforcement rejected a defensive 
“pass-on” argument in a typical vertical chain of distribution because 
it would allow those who violated antitrust laws to retain illegal profits.
Additionally, the Court expressed concern about the difficulty in pass-
on cases to determine, “in the real economic world rather than an 
economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's 
price will have on its total sales . . . [t]reble-damage actions would 
often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving 
massive evidence and complicated theories.”13
The next time the Supreme Court specifically addressed efficient 
enforcement in antitrust litigation was in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
(Illinois Brick).14 In Illinois Brick, petitioners, the manufacturers and 
12 Hanover, 392 U.S. at 494. The Court in Hanover also discussed an exception to 
the no pass-on defense where cases involved a cost-plus contract. Id. The cost-plus 
exception is not addressed in this paper.
13 Id. at 493. While the concern that defendants in antitrust actions may be allowed 
to keep their ill-gotten gains remains, the Court seems to have abandoned its
concern about over-complicated antitrust proceedings with evidence of complex 
economic theories. Since the 1968 decision in Hanover, the Court has embraced 
economic theory as a necessary evidentiary component of antitrust litigation, 
particularly in its rulings holding that most per se antitrust violations should now 
apply a rule of reason analysis which requires complex economic theory evidence 
and increases the costs of antitrust litigation. This application of economic theory 
in antitrust litigation along with advances in technology allowing for such 
calculations brings in to question the Hanover Court’s concerns regarding massive 
evidence and complicated theories.
14 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720.
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distributors of concrete blocks, were accused of inflating prices 
through a cartel,15 a Sherman § 1 violation.16 Masonry contractors who 
purchased the concrete blocks from petitioners at the inflated prices 
passed-on the price increase in their bids to general contractors, who 
incorporated the masonry contractors’ bids in their bids to respondent 
owners, in this case the State of Illinois and local governmental 
entities. 17 Accordingly, the price increases were passed-on to 
respondents, indirect purchasers twice removed.
Referencing Hanover Shoe, the Court phrased the issue as follows:
Having decided that in general a pass-on theory may not be 
used defensively by an antitrust violator against a direct 
purchaser plaintiff, we must now decide whether that theory 
may be used offensively by an indirect purchaser plaintiff 
against an alleged violator.18
The Court held that the pass-on theory in a typical vertical chain of 
distribution could not be used offensively in the case before the Court 
due to a concern of duplicative recovery.19
The principal basis for the decision in Hanover Shoe was the 
Court's perception of the uncertainties and difficulties in 
analyzing price and out-put decisions “in the real economic 
world rather than an economist's hypothetical model,” and of 
the costs to the judicial system and the efficient enforcement of
the antitrust laws of attempting to reconstruct those decisions 
in the courtroom . . . we understand Hanover Shoe as resting 
on the judgment that the antitrust laws will be more effectively 
enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge 
in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff 
potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the 
amount it could show was absorbed by it.20
Here, the Court deemphasized the Hanover Court’s concern that 
allowing “pass-on” would result in defendants keeping their ill-gotten 
gains and, instead, focused on the concern about the difficulties in 
15 Id.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
17 Thus, taxpayer money was used to pay the cartel’s inflated prices.
18 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
19 Id. at 730–31.
20 Id. at 731–32, 734–35 (emphasis added).
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apply economic theory and duplicative recovery.21
The Court again discussed efficient enforcement in Blue Shield 
of Va. v. McCready22 (Blue Shield) which was not a pass-on case in a 
typical vertical chain of distribution. In Blue Shield, respondent was an 
employee insured through her employer under a health care plan that 
paid for psychotherapy performed by psychiatrists but not 
psychologists. Petitioners were the insurance provider and a 
psychiatrists’ professional association. Respondent alleged an antitrust 
conspiracy and claimed damages for refusal to reimburse for 
psychologist services she received. In allowing the claim, the Court 
held:
The policies identified in Hawaii23 and Illinois Brick plainly 
offer no support for petitioners here. Both cases focused on the 
risk of duplicative recovery engendered by allowing every 
person along a chain of distribution to claim damages arising 
from a single transaction that violated the antitrust laws. But 
permitting respondent to proceed in the circumstances of this 
case offers not the slightest possibility of a duplicative exaction 
from petitioners. McCready has paid her psychologist's bills; 
her injury consists of Blue Shield's failure to pay her. Her 
psychologist can link no claim of injury to himself arising from 
his treatment of McCready; he has been fully paid for his 
service and has not been injured by Blue Shield's refusal to 
reimburse her for the cost of his services. And whatever the 
adverse effect of Blue Shield's actions on McCready's 
employer, who purchased the plan, it is not the employer as 
purchaser, but its employees as subscribers, who are out of 
pocket as a consequence of the plan's failure to pay benefits.24
In Blue Shield the Court then went on to address the specific issue 
of remoteness:
21 Which is ironic considering the current reliance by courts on complex economic 
theory in civil antitrust cases.
22 Blue Shield, 457 U.S. 465.
23 Haw. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262–64 (1972). The Supreme 
Court held that the state of Hawaii could sue for damages the state incurred due to 
the antitrust violation as could the citizens of the state of Hawaii, but to allow the 
state of Hawaii to sue for damages to its general economy would amount to 
duplicative damages already reflected in the damages sought by the state and its 
citizens. There is no further discussion relating to efficient enforcers.
24 Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 474–75.
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[I]ndeed, the unrestrictive language of [Clayton Act § 4], and 
the avowed breadth of the congressional purpose, cautions us 
not to cabin § 4 in ways that will defeat its broad remedial 
objective. But the potency of the remedy implies the need for 
some care in its application. In the absence of direct guidance 
from Congress, and faced with the claim that a particular injury 
is too remote from the alleged violation to warrant § 4 
standing, the courts are thus forced to resort to an analysis no 
less elusive than that employed traditionally by courts at 
common law with respect to the matter of “proximate cause.” . 
. . The harm to McCready and her class was clearly foreseeable; 
indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of the 
alleged illegal conspiracy. Where the injury alleged is so 
integral an aspect of the conspiracy alleged, there can be no 
question but that the loss was precisely “the type of loss that 
the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.”25
Here, the issue of remoteness is addressed in the context of antitrust 
injury rather than efficient enforcer. However, as discussed below, 
lower courts will confuse the remoteness factor as an efficient enforcer 
factor in later decisions attempting to apply the efficient enforcer rule.
In Associated General Contractors of California v. California 
State Council of Carpenters, (Associated Gen.)26 the Supreme Court 
was again called upon to opine regarding efficient enforcement and 
antitrust injury, but not in a pass-on case involving a typical vertical 
chain of distribution. Respondent Unions alleged that petitioner, an 
employers’ association, coerced certain third parties to enter into 
business relationships with nonunion firms, in violation of the antitrust 
laws. In interpreting the damage provision for a private right of action 
under Clayton § 4,27 the Court noted the legislative history of the 
Sherman Act with specific reference to its common law background.28
25 Id. at 477, 479 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477, 489 (1977), quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 
125 (1969)).
26 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 538–44 (1983).
27 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
28 Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 530. The Court’s historical analysis is questionable. 
The Court states that at the time of the enactment of Sherman the legislature was 
primarily concerned with the protection of consumers. The Court further cites to 
Senator Sherman, for whom the Sherman Act was named, for the proposition that 
the Sherman Act merely “applies old and well recognized principles of the 
common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government.” 
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This common law background and the concern about interpreting 
antitrust statutes too broadly, informed the Court in its decision 
evaluating the “plaintiff's harm” (antitrust injury), “the alleged 
wrongdoing by the defendants,” (antitrust conduct) and the 
“relationship between them” (efficient enforcement).29 The Court then 
addressed the issue of remoteness as applied to foreseeability, 
proximate cause and directness of injury:
Thus in 1910 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held as 
a matter of law that neither a creditor nor a stockholder of a 
corporation that was injured by a violation of the antitrust laws 
Id. at 531. While Senator Sherman may have intended his act to codify common 
law for the protection of consumers at the federal level, what we got from Congress 
was something quite different. While there is not an extensive legislative history 
for the Sherman Act, a brief perusal of the Congressional record reveals that the 
final Sherman Act, which came to the floor after revisions in the Judiciary 
Committee, did not reflect Senator Sherman’s original bill and, indeed, Senator 
Sherman was quite disappointed in the result fearing it had been significantly 
watered down. The section of the Congressional Record cited by the Court in 
Associated Gen. came before the Judiciary Committee’s revisions to Senator 
Sherman’s bill. Despite this historical record, many scholars and courts have used 
statements from the debate over Senator Sherman's bill – which Congress did not 
pass – to infer Congress's legislative intent in passing the Judiciary Committee's 
bill. Most historians attribute the language of the Sherman Act to Senator Hoar, 
who was on the Judiciary Committee which put forth the final version of the 
Sherman Act, which passed. Regarding the Sherman Act, Senator Hoar stated, 
“The great thing that this bill does . . . is to extend the common-law principles, 
which protected fair competition in trade in old times in England, to international 
and interstate commerce.” 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (Apr. 8, 1890) (statement of 
Senator Hoar). The common law principles of England related to regrating, 
engrossing, and forestalling which were denounced by Adam Smith in the Wealth 
of Nations and repealed in England . . . twice! First regarding statutes on regrating, 
engrossing, and forestalling in 1772 and the second time in 1844 to address the 
continued application by courts of “common law” relating to regrating, engrossing, 
and forestalling by utterly abolishing the common-law crimes of forestalling, 
engrossing, and regrating. Forestalling, Regrating, etc. Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 24 
(U.K.). This occurred a mere six years before the United States enacted the 
Sherman Act in 1890. Interestingly, nothing in the historical record evidence the 
economic efficiency advocated by courts today as the “intent” of Congress in 
passing the Sherman Act and I dare say if one were to bring a Sherman antitrust 
claim today based upon the common law of regrating, engrossing, or forestalling 
the claim would be dismissed. Further, the historical record indicates that Senator 
Sherman’s original bill included the word “consumer” which was omitted in the 
final bill that passed. 19 CONG. REC. 8483 (Sept. 11, 1888). Now what are we to 
make of that?
29 Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 535.
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could recover treble damages under § 7. The court explained 
that the plaintiff's injury as a stockholder was “indirect, remote, 
and consequential.”30
Here, a typical damage analysis is applied where damages may be 
proximately caused by the conduct but are not recoverable because the 
damages are too remote undermining foreseeability. The Court then 
continued its discussion on the remoteness or indirectness of 
respondent’s claim in the context of antitrust injury:
In this case, however, the Union was neither a consumer nor a 
competitor in the market in which trade was restrained. It is not 
clear whether the Union's interests would be served or 
disserved by enhanced competition in the market. As a general 
matter, a union's primary goal is to enhance the earnings and 
improve the working conditions of its membership; that goal is 
not necessarily served, and indeed may actually be harmed, by 
uninhibited competition among employers striving to reduce 
costs in order to obtain a competitive advantage over their 
rivals.31
This part of the Court’s opinion relates to antitrust injury, the type of 
injury antitrust laws are intended to address. Indeed, the Court
specifically cites antitrust injury cases, such as Brunswick, not efficient 
enforcement cases.32 However, the Court goes on to discuss efficient 
enforcement cases starting with Hanover.33 The Court’s opinion notes 
that the concerns articulated in the efficient enforcement cases are the 
importance of avoiding either the risk of duplicate recoveries on the 
one hand, or the danger of complex apportionment of damages on the 
other. 34 In Associated Gen., the efficient enforcer factors of
indirectness of the injury or remoteness goes to the issues of
duplicative and complex apportionment of damages not antitrust injury 
issues.35
However, confusion arises when the Court included a catch-all 
paragraph that seems to mix efficient enforcer factors with antitrust 
30 Id. at 533–34 (citing Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 
1910)).
31 Id. at 539.
32 See id. at 538.
33 See id. at 543–45.
34 Id. at 541–45.
35 Id. at 543–44.
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injury factors by stating that other factors, including “the nature of the 
Union's injury, the tenuous and speculative character of the 
relationship between the alleged antitrust violation and the Union's 
alleged injury [remoteness], the potential for duplicative recovery or 
complex apportionment of damages, and the existence of more direct 
victims of the alleged [antitrust violation]” should be considered.36
While the Court’s Associated Gen. opinion is less than clear on the 
application of factors to consider for antitrust efficient enforcer as 
distinct from antitrust injury, the Associated Gen. opinion does support 
the distinct specific efficient enforcer concerns regarding duplicative 
recovery and complex apportionment of damages.
Finally, in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., (Cargill), respondent, 
the fifth largest U.S. beef packer, brought an action to enjoin the
merger of petitioner, the second largest U.S. beef packer with the third 
largest U.S. beef packer. 37 This was a price squeeze case where 
respondent alleged it would be harmed by the price-cost squeeze 
resulting in lost profits.38 Again, not a pass-on case involving a typical 
vertical chain of distribution. The district court and court of appeals 
considered the price-cost squeeze predatory pricing. The Supreme 
Court disagreed.
The Court held that in antitrust merger cases, “a private plaintiff 
must allege threatened loss or damage ‘of the type the antitrust laws 
were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendants' acts unlawful.’”39 This is an antitrust injury analysis. 40
According to the Court, this case presented vigorous competition, not 
predatory pricing. However, the Court also noted that Clayton §16 
(injunction) did not pose the threat of duplicative recovery so the 
standing requirements were different. In effect, the efficient enforcer 
rule did not apply in a case where only an injunction was sought.41
Taken together, this creates an efficient enforcer rule that one is 
36 Id. at 545. A person injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws within 
the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act, Id. at 545–46, which is the antitrust injury 
standard articulated in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 
485–89 (1977). It does not appear to be an efficient enforcer statement as the 
efficient enforcer recognizes that there may be antitrust injury but no standing 
because of the complexity or duplicative recovery issues. Jay L. Himes, When 
Caught with Your Hand in the Cookie Jar . . . Argue Standing, 41 RUTGERS L.J.
187, 202–03 (2009).
37 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
38 Id. at 104. 
39 Id. at 113 (citing to Brunswick, 429 U.S. 477 at 489).
40 See Brunswick, 429 U.S. 477, 485–89.
41 Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111 n.6.
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not an efficient enforcer in antitrust cases where there is substantial 
risk of duplicative recovery or the probability of complex 
apportionment of damages. The problems of duplicative recovery or 
complex apportionment of damages are particularly apparent in pass-
on cases involving multiple victims in a typical vertical chain of 
distribution. Factors to consider in evaluating the risk of duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment are:
(1) causation;
(2) direct victims;
(3) highly speculative damages; and
(4) risk of duplicative damages.42
As efficient enforcement is concerned with duplicative recovery 
and complex apportionment, causation should focus on whether more 
remote plaintiffs increase the probability of duplicative recovery or 
complex apportionment. 43 The direct victims factor is nothing more 
than one way to solve the above causation problem for efficient 
enforcement. 44 The speculative nature of plaintiff’s damages has
efficient enforcement application but in the context of complex 
apportionment, a particular problem in pass-on cases in the typical
vertical chain of distribution. Additionally, complex apportionment, if 
misapplied, may lead to duplicative damages. Duplicative damages is
an efficient enforcer not an antitrust injury factor. Generally speaking, 
cases that do not involve a pass-on in a typical vertical chain of 
distribution are less likely to involve efficient enforcer problems.45
While the efficient enforcer rule may be applicable in cases that do 
not involve pass-on claims in a typical vertical chain of distribution, in 
such cases highly speculative damages and the fact that the plaintiff is 
not a consumer nor competitor may be particularly relevant for 
efficient enforcer analysis. 46 Finally, the duplicative recovery or 
complex apportionment considerations need to be balanced with 
concerns regarding allowing defendants to keep illegal profits.47
Rather dealing with the difficulties of whether there is a problem 
of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment, some appellate 
courts have conflated antitrust injury and efficient enforcer factors or 
taken a reductionist approach that indirect victims are not efficient 
42 Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 540–45.
43 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 738–39 (1977).
44 See Id. at 731–35.
45 See, e.g., Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
46 See, e.g., Associated Gen., 459 U.S. 519.
47 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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enforcers. As discussed below, there is a lack of clarity in appellate 
decisions. Courts should focus on an efficient enforcer rule limited to 
the analysis of duplicative recovery and complex apportionment
balanced with concerns regarding allowing defendants to keep illegal 
profits.
B. Appellate Court Decisions Applying the Efficient Enforcer Rule
The Federal Appellate courts have not been consistent in their 
application of the Supreme Court’s efficient enforcer rule. The 
problem is one of conflating antitrust injury factors with efficient 
enforcer factors rather than the efficient enforcer focus on duplicative 
recovery and complex apportionment. The First, Third, Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits apply a conflated antitrust injury/efficient enforcer 
antitrust standing test while the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, 
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits apply a two-prong standing test with 
antitrust injury being the first prong and efficient enforcer the second 
prong. Unfortunately, even in the two-prong standing analysis, 
efficient enforcer factors are not, necessarily, tied to duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment. Additionally, there is a dearth of 
analysis on concerns regarding allowing defendants to keep illegal 
profits.
1. The Conflated Antitrust Injury/Efficient Enforcer Antitrust 
Standing Test
The conflated antitrust injury/efficient enforcer antitrust standing 
test applies the Associated Gen. factors without regard to the distinct 
analysis required for antitrust injury and efficient enforcer. The result 
in these cases is often a lack of clarity and false negatives in civil 
antitrust cases.
a. The First Circuit
The First Circuit articulates a test for antitrust standing where 
antitrust injury and efficient enforcer factors are conflated.48 These 
factors are stated as follows:
(1) the causal connection between the alleged antitrust 
violation and harm to the plaintiff; 
(2) an improper motive; 
48 Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1994).
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(3) the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury and whether the 
injury was of a type that Congress sought to redress with
the antitrust laws;
(4) the directness with which the alleged market restraint 
caused the asserted injury; 
(5) the speculative nature of the damages; and 
(6) the risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment 
of damages.49
The First Circuit has only given detailed analysis regarding factors (3),
(4) and (5). Factor (3) is the antitrust injury factor which is balanced 
with the other five specified standing factors.50
Regarding factor (4), directness, a simple “but-for” analysis is not 
sufficient in cases where another party has the direct injury and the 
plaintiff’s injury is more removed from defendant’s conduct and 
possibly caused by intervening acts.51 While this may go to duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment if both the direct and indirect 
parties are damaged, it is articulated as an injury (proximate 
cause/foreseeability) problem given the expressed concern regarding 
intervening acts.
The First Circuit has also given some guidance on factor (5), the 
speculative nature of the damages. Here, the more assumptions which 
must be made regarding positive economic factors, while at the same 
time ignoring negative economic factors, the more likely the damages 
will be speculative. For example, in Sullivan, plaintiff’s evidence of 
damage required assuming that plaintiff could have obtained capital 
through a public sale of stock (which defendant prevented) while 
ignoring the facts of plaintiff’s high level of indebtedness causing 
bankruptcy and inability to obtain private financing through other 
means.
b. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit articulates antitrust standing factors in a similar 
fashion to that of the First Circuit, but it articulates five factors:
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and 
the harm to the plaintiff and the intent by the defendant to 
cause that harm, with neither factor alone conferring 
49 Id at 46.
50 Id. 
51 See id. at 51–52.
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standing; 
(2) whether the plaintiff's alleged injury is of the type for which 
the antitrust laws were intended to provide redress; 
(3) the directness of the injury, which addresses the concerns 
that liberal application of standing principles might 
produce speculative claims; 
(4) the existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust 
violations; and 
(5) the potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment of damages.52
The first, second, and third factors have been applied by the Third 
Circuit without regard to duplicative damages and complex 
apportionment. Addressing the first factor, a conspiracy by defendants 
aimed at preventing plaintiff from competing in the market satisfies 
the causal connection/defendant intent factor.53 The second factor is an 
antitrust injury analysis under Brunswick. 54 The third factor of 
directness goes to the issue of speculation in that the more removed 
plaintiff’s damages are from defendant’s conduct, the more 
speculative the damages.55
The fourth factor addresses plaintiff’s directness/indirectness 
similar to the first factor in the Second Circuit efficient enforcer 
analysis. Here, once again the court looks to see if plaintiff’s harm is 
first in line or more removed from defendant’s conduct. In this regard, 
the absence of harm caused by a “pass-on” from the direct victim may 
be relevant.56 The Third Circuit has explained the fourth factor in 
terms of an absolute bar for indirect victims in lost profits cases:
“Even commentators who advocate for indirect purchaser 
standing and a lost profits measure of damages admit that their 
position is currently precluded by Supreme Court case law. As 
Professor Harrison concedes in his article arguing for indirect 
purchaser standing and a lost profits measure of damages, 
‘[t]he Illinois Brick decision seems absolutely to foreclose the 
possibility of indirect-purchaser standing in price enhancement 
suits,’ even if the indirect purchaser plaintiffs seek lost profits 
as opposed to overcharge damages. Harrison also 
52 Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 1999).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 274–75
55 Id. at 275. 
56 Id.
2019] ANTITRUST EFFICIENT ENFORCER 115
acknowledges that:
the legal precedents and policy arguments relied on by 
the [Hanover Shoe] Court in rejecting the pass-on
defense do not support even the theoretical
appropriateness of the lost profits measure. In addition, 
the Court hinted that it was actually rejecting the very 
notion that damages should be apportioned among 
various layers of buyers and sellers . . . [T]o the extent 
that the apportionment process has been rejected by the 
Court, it would be inappropriate to infer that the lost 
profits measure has received even implicit approval.”57
Accordingly, when the plaintiff purchases from a middleman who 
passes on price enhancements from the defendant, the plaintiff is not 
an efficient enforcer due to complex apportionment. However, “[t]he 
‘control exception’ to Illinois Brick ‘might’ permit an indirect 
purchaser to sue an initial seller when the initial seller ‘own[s] or 
control [s]’ the direct purchaser.”58
As for the fifth factor of duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment of damages, the Third Circuit has stated that here the 
concern is with potential plaintiffs not a party to the action before the 
court suing for the same injury as may be the case where the antitrust 
defendant overcharges the middleman who pass-on some or all of the 
overcharge to plaintiff.59
Additionally, the more remote the plaintiff, the more speculative 
and complex the calculation for damages.60 If, however, the facts and 
circumstances indicate that the middleman would only be claiming lost 
profits due to a decrease in volume and the downstream plaintiff is 
seeking damages based upon overcharge, the injuries would not be the 
same and Illinois Brick would not apply as in the case where the 
middleman is challenging a resale price maintenance requirement from 
the upstream defendant while the downstream plaintiff has a claim for 
price overcharge.61
57 Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 375 (3rd Cir. 
2005).
58 Id. at 371 (citing to Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n. 16 (1977)).
59 Id. at 376–77; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 85–86 (3rd Cir. 
2011).
60 Warren Gen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 86.
61 Howard Hess Dental Labs., 424 F.3d at 376–77.
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c. The Fourth Circuit
In the Fourth Circuit, antitrust standing is analyzed by taking into 
consideration: the risk of duplicative recovery; the extent to which the 
claim is based upon speculative, abstract, or impractical measures of 
damages; the causal connection between the alleged violation and the 
harm suffered; and the relationship of the injury alleged to the forms 
of injury about which Congress was concerned.62 Unfortunately, the 
Fourth Circuit does not provide the analysis to determine how this test 
would be applied.
d. The Ninth Circuit
In the Ninth Circuit, courts apply a five-factor antitrust standing 
test:
(1) the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury; that is, whether 
it was the type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall; 
(2) the directness of the injury; 
(3) the speculative measure of the harm; 
(4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and 
(5) the complexity in apportioning damages.63
The first factor is the antitrust injury factor under Brunswick. The 
second, third, fourth and fifth factors are efficient enforcer factors. The 
second factor is the indirect purchaser factor which, according to the 
Ninth Circuit, limits the standing of indirect purchasers under Illinois 
Brick. 64 Regarding the third factor, the speculative measure of the 
harm, such as claims of intervening factors, will not make damages 
speculative when plaintiffs allege that rigging, such as bid rigging, 
controlled prices in the relevant market.65 This should be clarified as a 
duplicative and/or complex apportionment issue. As for the fifth factor 
of complex apportionment, this “comes into play when multiple 
classes or layers of claimants seek, or might seek, compensation.”66
62 Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 219 
(4th Cir. 1987).
63 Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Edgar Swift, Standing by Your Man Ray: Troubles with Antitrust Standing in Art 
Authentication Cases, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 247, 263 (2014).
64 Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Knevelbaard Dairies, 232 F.3d at 991.
65 Knevelbaard Dairies, 232 F.3d at 991.
66 Id. at 992.
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2. The Two-Prong Standing Test
As with the conflated antitrust injury/efficient enforcer antitrust 
standing test, the two-prong standing test applies the Associated Gen.
factors without regard to the distinct analysis required for efficient 
enforcer with a focus on duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment and balancing these problems with concerns regarding 
allowing defendants to keep illegal profits.
a. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has extensively dealt with the efficient enforcer 
rule. The Second Circuit treats antitrust standing as a two-prong test: 
First, plaintiff must establish an antitrust injury under Brunswick and 
second, plaintiff must be an efficient enforcer. 67 If plaintiff cannot 
establish the first prong, antitrust injury, the case may be dismissed 
without consideration of the efficient enforcer prong.68 However, even 
if a plaintiff establishes antitrust injury a court may find a lack of 
standing if it is determined that plaintiff is not an efficient enforcer.69
In addressing the second standing prong, the efficient enforcer, the 
Second Circuit considers four factors:
(1) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury;
(2) the existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-
interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the 
public interest in antitrust enforcement;
(3) the speculative nature of the alleged injury; and the 
difficulty of identifying damages; and 
(4) apportioning them among direct and indirect victims to 
67 Gatt Commc'ns Inc. v. PMC Assoc., LLC, 711 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); Siti-
Sites.com, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 428 F. App’x 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2011); 
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 688 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121–122 (2d Cir. 
2007); Paycom Billing Servs. Inc. v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 290–91
(2d Cir. 2006); Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 437–38 (2d 
Cir. 2005); Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793, 797, n.9 (2d Cir. 1994); Volvo N. Am. 
Corp. v. Men's Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1988).
68 G.K.A. Beverage Corp. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 766–67 (2d Cir. 1995).
69 Mastercard Int'l, 467 F.3d at 290–91; Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443–44; Men's Int’l 
Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d at 66.
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avoid duplicative recoveries.70
Factors (1)-(3) appear to be antitrust injury factors. The efficient 
enforcer factor is clearly factor (4). If we are to consider factors (1)-
(3) as efficient enforcer factors, separate and distinct from antitrust 
injury, then factors (1)-(3) should only be considered in the context of 
duplicative damages and complex apportionment. Unfortunately, they 
are not.
The Second Circuit has observed that the weight to be given the 
various factors will necessarily vary with the circumstances of 
particular cases as the Supreme Court has given little guidance 
regarding the weight to be given to each factor.71 That said, the dearth 
of guidance persists at the appellate court level as well.
i. The Directness or Indirectness of the 
Asserted Injury
Generally, directness in antitrust law is a proximate cause 
analysis.72 Directness in the antitrust context means close in the chain 
of causation. 73 In discussing the direct/indirect injury factor, the 
Second Circuit has held that this factor has not been met when the 
allegations involve an offensive pass-on theory.74 According to Illinois 
Brick, the concerns regarding offensive pass-on for purposes of 
efficient enforcement are duplicative damages and complex 
apportionment. These concerns are particularly apparent in offensive
pass-on cases.
Further, in vertical chain of distribution cases involving the sale of 
non-financial products, facts may indicate numerous intervening 
market variables which may have affected pricing outside of 
defendants’ conduct. Such facts may break the chain of causation as 
70 Gatt Commc'ns, 711 F.3d at 78; In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 688; Port Dock & 
Stone Corp, 507 F.3d at 121–22; Mastercard Int’l, 467 F.3d at 290–91; Daniel, 428
F.3d at 443–44; Men's Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d at 66; Alaska Elec. 
Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 175 F.Supp.3d 44, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
71 Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443 (citing generally to Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 46 
(1st Cir. 1994); See also Gatt, 711 F.3d at 78, and Paycom, 467 F.3d at 291.
72 Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d Cir. 
2014); In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 
WL 4379112, at *8 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014).
73 Gatt, 711 F.3d at 78 (quoting Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Platform Solutions, Inc., 
658 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)); Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 
4379112, at *8 (quoting Gatt, 711 F.3d at 78).
74 See e.g., Paycom 467 F.3d at 291–92.
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well as inject speculation into the analysis.75
Additionally, where the facts indicate plaintiff’s antitrust injury is 
derived from plaintiff’s refusal to continue abiding to a price-fixing 
agreement the plaintiff is an indirect victim particularly compared to 
victims who had to pay the higher prices due to the conspiracy.76 The 
reasoning here is more in line with Brunswick’s antitrust injury 
analysis. It has absolutely nothing to do with duplicative recovery or
complex apportionment.
ii. The Existence of an Identifiable Class of 
Persons Whose Self-Interest Would 
Normally Motivate Them to Vindicate the 
Public Interest in Antitrust Enforcement
In addressing the second factor, the Second Circuit decisions 
indicate this factor goes more to the antitrust injury question rather 
than efficient enforcer. That said, the Second Circuit has shown a 
reluctance to find an efficient enforcer where the plaintiff’s main 
complaint is that defendants would not admit plaintiff to their “you too 
can charge supra-competitive prices” club. In such situations, plaintiff 
has “no natural economic self-interest in reducing . . . cost[s] . . . to 
consumers.”77
A person most motivated by self-interest in the proper, pro-
competitive/pro-consumer sense, is the question to be answered not is 
this the person most motivated by self-interest. 78 Accordingly, 
“[i]nferiority to other potential plaintiffs can be relevant, but it is not 
dispositive.”79 Plaintiffs, who are competitors and suffer lost profits
and plaintiffs, who are consumers and suffer the payment of higher 
prices may both meet this factor depending on the circumstances of 
each case.80
Direct injury, under the first factor, may also be evidence of the 
second factor as direct injury victims may have more economic 
incentive than down-stream victims. Still, courts must consider if such 
75 Reading Industries, Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp. Eyeglasses, 631 F.2d 10, 13–
14 (2d Cir. 1980).
76 Gatt, 711 F.3d at 78–79.
77 Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443–44 (2d Cir. 2005).
78 In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 585 F.3d 677, 688–89 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (citing to Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 
283, 291 (2d Cir. 2006).
79 DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 689 (citing to Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., Int'l, 
256 F.3d 799, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
80 DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 689.
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plaintiffs may lack the incentive or the ability to seek relief. In this 
regard, it is possible that the second factor may go to the efficient 
enforcer issue of duplicative damages as a plaintiff with more 
economic incentive may capture more of the antitrust injury than 
indirect plaintiffs. Additionally, a direct plaintiff may not have to 
address a skewed cost/benefit analysis of complex apportionment
litigation as apportionment may increase the cost of litigation reducing 
the motivation to litigate. However, the mere fact that such potential 
plaintiffs have not sued is not dispositive of such lack of incentive or 
inability as it may also be evidence of a lack of merit regarding the 
antitrust allegations.81
iii. The Speculative Nature of the Alleged 
Injury
Critical to the speculative factor is the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that [t]he most elementary conceptions of justice and 
public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the 
uncertainty which his own wrong has created.82 Still, a civil antitrust 
plaintiff must bear some burden of reducing speculation. Economic 
evidence such as modeling, data and analysis may be sufficient. 83
Additionally, evidence from relevant regulators may also reduce 
speculation. 84 However, allegations of lost profits based upon 
historical earnings and nothing more may be speculative particularly 
where plaintiff’s alleged lost profits is based upon historical profits 
earned as part of an anticompetitive scheme.85
As with the previous two factors discussed above, the Second 
Circuit’s opinions regarding the speculative factor is expressed in 
terms more in line with antitrust injury than in terms of the duplicative 
recover and complex apportionment in an efficient enforcer analysis.
Once again, speculative damages should be addressed in terms of 
81 Gatt, 711 F.3d at 79.
82 DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 689 (citing Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 
265 (1946)).
83 In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL 
4379112, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014).
84 Id.
85 Compare Gatt, 711 F.3d at 79 with Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of 
America Corp., 175 F. Supp. 3d 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding damages not too 
speculative in a case involving price-fixing the ISDA fix benchmark in a manner 
that reduced income flows to plaintiffs).
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concerns regarding duplicative damages 86 and complex 
apportionment,87 but it is not.
iv. The Difficulty of Identifying Damages and 
Apportioning Them Among Direct and 
Indirect Victims to Avoid Duplicative 
Recoveries
Finally, the Second Circuit has examined the nature of the recovery 
sought to determine if there will be duplicative recoveries. For 
example, lost profit damages due to reduced volume and overcharges 
are different in nature and do not pose the threat of duplicative 
damages.88 However, lost profits claimed by one plaintiff competitor
may be the same claimed by another competitor with no way of 
determining which competitor would have successfully captured the 
market share represented by the claimed lost profits.89 This causes a 
complex apportionment problem. Similarly, in the overcharge
situation there is a risk of duplicative recovery with indirect plaintiffs 
under the offensive pass-on situation in a vertical chain of distribution.
If we extrapolate the Second Circuit’s efficient enforcer factors as 
applied to the Supreme Court’s stated goal of efficient enforcement,
avoidance of duplicative damages and complex apportionment, it 
appears that the directness factor, speculative factor and duplicative 
factor are interrelated. Indirect purchasers with speculative damages 
are more likely to have to rely on complex economic theories of 
apportionment, which may also increase the risk of duplicative 
damages.
b. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit also applies a two-prong standing test:
(1) Antitrust injury under Brunswick; and
(2) An efficient enforcer test.90
86 For example, one may be able to present evidence that the more speculative the 
damages, the greater chance there will be for duplication.
87 Here, the example could be evidence of the lack of reliability of complex 
apportionment due to the speculative nature of the model used. This could also 
increase the probability of duplication of damages.
88 DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 689; Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *9.
89 Gatt, 711 F.3d at 79.
90 See Sanger Ins. Agency v. HUB Int’l., Ltd., 802 F.3d 732, 737 (5th Cir. 2015), 
and Norris v. Hearst Tr., 500 F.3d 454, 465 (5th Cir. 2007).
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As for the efficient enforcer test, the Fifth Circuit applies three 
factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff's injuries or their causal link to the 
defendant are speculative;
(2) whether other parties have been more directly harmed; and
(3) whether allowing this plaintiff to sue would risk multiple 
lawsuits, duplicative recoveries, or complex damage 
apportionment.91
We don’t have case law that clarifies the Fifth Circuit’s application 
of these factors, but one wonders why have factors (1) and (2) as 
separate factors when they should be considered in relation to factor 
(3).
c. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit also applies the two-prong antitrust standing 
test92 with the efficient enforcer prong containing four factors:
(1) the nature of the [claimant's] injury;
(2) the tenuous and speculative character of the relationship 
between the alleged antitrust violation and the [claimant's] 
alleged injury;
(3) the potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment of damages; and
(4) the existence of more direct victims of the alleged 
conspiracy.93
As with the Fifth Circuit, we don’t have case law that clarifies the 
Sixth Circuit’s application of these factors.
d. The Seventh Circuit
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit applies the two-prong antitrust 
standing test.94 However, the Seventh Circuit again conflates antitrust 
91 Norris, 500 F.3d at 465.
92 NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2007).
93 Id.
94 Fisher v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 558 F. App’x 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2014); 
Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391, 395–96
(7th Cir. 1993); In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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injury and efficient enforcer factors. The efficient enforcer factors 
include:
(1) the causal connection between the alleged antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff;
(2) improper motive; 
(3) whether the injury was of a type that Congress sought to 
redress with the antitrust laws; 
(4) the directness between the injury and the market restraint; 
(5) the speculative nature of the damages; and
(6) the risk of duplicate recoveries or complex damages 
apportionment.95
Factors one, two, and three appear to be relevant to the antitrust 
injury prong.96 The fourth, fifth, and sixth factors incorporate efficient 
enforcer language. In addressing the fourth factor, the direct/indirect 
factor has been articulated by the Seventh Circuit as granting standing 
only to consumers or competitors who suffer immediate injuries.97 The 
Seventh Circuit also appears to enhance the efficient enforcer standard 
to the “most” efficient enforcer but with little analysis to differentiate 
this standard.98 Further, an identifiable class of persons whose self-
interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest 
in antitrust enforcement99 has been required for this factor, provided 
that it is not likely to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected 
or unremedied. 100 (This is a balancing test involving the need to 
balance the interests of deterrence of antitrust violations through 
private antitrust enforcement and avoidance of excessive treble 
95 Fisher, 558 F. App’x at 655; Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs. Inc., 463 
F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir. 2006). 
96 See Kochert, 463 F.3d at 719.
97 Kochert, 463 F.3d at 718–19; Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 598 
(7th Cir. 1995); Indus. Gas, 681 F.2d at 520.
98 Fisher, 558 F. App’x at 655 (7th Cir. 2014); Kochert, 463 F.3d at 718. For a 
critique of the “most” efficient enforcer see Jonathan M. Jacobson and Tracy Greer, 
Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 296–99 (1998) (pointing out some courts 
hold that competitors are the most efficient enforcer while other courts hold that 
consumers are the most efficient enforcer).
99 Kochert, 463 F.3d at 718 (citing to Serfecz, 67 F.3d at 598); Fisher, 558 F. App’x 
at 655.
100 Kochert, 463 F.3d at 719 (citing to Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. 
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1982)).
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damages litigation).101 Factors five and six are not clearly defined, 
however, factor six is the efficient enforcer standard, yet it is unclear 
how factors four and five address duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment.
e. The Tenth Circuit
In the Tenth Circuit, antitrust injury is treated as a threshold 
requirement similar to the Second Circuit.102 Efficient enforcer factors 
include the directness or remoteness of the injury suffered by the 
plaintiff, which, in turn, depends on the existence of other more 
directly-injured possible plaintiffs. 103 Here, the directly injured 
requirement relates to an identifiable class of persons whose self-
interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest 
in antitrust enforcement.104 As with other circuits, this “self-interest” 
requirement has been met when the plaintiff is a competitor or a 
consumer. 105 This analysis does little to clarify how to apply the 
directness standard or the motivation standard to duplicative recovery 
or complex apportionment.
f. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit also follows a two-prong approach with 
antitrust injury as the first prong and efficient enforcer as the second 
prong.106 As for efficient enforcer,107 the factors include:
101 Fisher, 558 F. App’x at 655; See Kochert, 463 F.3d at 718–19.
102 Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1267 (10th Cir. 
2006).
103 Id. at 1268 (citing Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 542; Todorov v. DCH 
Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1451 (11th Cir. 1991)).
104 Id. (citing Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 542).
105 Id.
106 Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estee Lauder Cos., Inc., 797 F.3d 1248, 1272 (11th
Cir. 2015); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 
1264, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013); Palmyra Park Hosp. Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem'l 
Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010); Fla. Seed Co. v. Monsanto Co., 105 
F.3d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1997); Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1449; Mun. Utils. v. Ala. 
Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1991). 
107 The court notes that a plaintiff seeking an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton 
Act differs from § 4 treble damages because § 16 only requires a showing of 
“threatened” loss or damage while § 4 requires a showing of injury to “business or 
property.” Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1452. Additionally, the efficient enforcer 
requirements are less stringent for the equitable remedy of an injunction because 
the risk of duplicative recovery or the danger of complex apportionment is not 
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(1) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; 
(2) the remoteness of the injury; 
(3) whether other potential plaintiffs were better suited to 
vindicate the harm; 
(4) whether the damages were highly speculative; 
(5) the extent which the apportionment of damages was highly 
complex and would risk duplicative recoveries; and 
(6) whether the plaintiff would be able to efficiently and 
effectively enforce the judgment.108
These factors are often entwined and other factors may be considered 
for the efficient enforcer prong.109 For example, factors one, two and 
four may be combined rather than analyzed separately in situations 
where plaintiff claims injury due to defendants monopolist position in 
the market. 110 As with the Second Circuit, a plaintiff whose main 
complaint seems to be denial of access to a group charging supra-
competitive prices will not be an efficient enforcer. 111 However, 
competitors and consumers may be direct plaintiffs and, thus, efficient 
enforcers.112
g. The D.C. Circuit
The D.C Circuit applies a two-prong antitrust standing test. The 
efficient enforcer factors include:
relevant. Id. at 1452; See Duty Free Americas, 797 F.3d at 1272–73 (11th Cir. 
2015); Palmyra Park Hosp., 604 F.3d at 1299–1300; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, 
The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1717, 1719 
(1990).
108 Sunbeam Television, 711 F.3d at 1271; Palmyra Park Hosp., 604 F.3d at 1299; 
Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1451–52. See also Ala. Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1500 
(11th Cir.1991) (addressing the first factor of direct/indirect plaintiff). 
109 Sunbeam Television, 711 F.3d at 1271–72; Palmyra Park Hosp., 604 F.3d at 
1299; Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1452.
110 See, e.g., Sunbeam Television, 711 F.3d at 1272–73 (holding that plaintiff must 
establish that a party was “willing and able to supply a superior product but for 
[defendant’s] exclusionary conduct” or else plaintiff will not be an efficient 
enforcer due to indirectness, remoteness and speculation (citing to Meijer, Inc. v. 
Biovail, Corp., 533 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 2008))).
111 Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1454; see also Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 
F.3d 408, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2005).
112 Fla. Seed Co. v. Monsanto Co., 105 F.3d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1997); Ala. 
Power Co., 934 F.2d at 1500. 
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(1) The speculative nature of the damages;
(2) the existence of more appropriate plaintiff; and
(3) the duplicative recovery and complex apportionment of 
damages.113
With regard to the first factor, plaintiff must establish that its 
damages were not shown to be attributable to other causes.114 As for 
the second factor, standing is less likely as “layers of superior plaintiffs 
increase.”115 While this could go to duplicative recovery and complex 
apportionment, case law makes this less than clear. The third factor 
considers “the risk of multiple recoveries and the difficulty of 
apportionment of damages.”116 Thus, the first and second factors again 
go more to antitrust injury. Granted, the first and second factors could 
go to the efficient enforcer issues of duplicative recovery and complex 
apportionment, but the D.C. Circuit conflates the first and second 
factor with a general damage analysis while the third factor is clearly 
the efficient enforcer factor.
C. The Efficient Enforcer Rule as it Stands Today
The efficient enforcer rule remains confused, in part, because it 
mixes antitrust injury considerations with the efficient enforcer 
considerations of duplicative recovery and complex apportionment. 
This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the probability that the efficient 
enforcer rule is applied in a manner that reflects judicial philosophy 
regarding antitrust law rather than any economic theory it purports to 
reflect.117
The concerns addressed by the efficient enforcer rule are
duplicative recovery and complex apportionment.118 Accordingly, the 
113 Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Intern., 256 F.3d 799, 815–17
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
114 Id. at 815.
115 Id. at 816.
116 Id. at 817.
117 Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir.1986), 
regarding confused nature of efficient enforcer); Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Law and 
Economics of (Functional) Antitrust Standing in the United States and the 
European Union, 26 FLA. J. INT'L L. 271, 276 (2014) (regarding more reflective 
judicial philosophy).
118 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 543–45 (1983); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474–
75 (1982) (regarding duplicative recovery); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 
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Associated Gen. factors repeatedly referenced should be applied in a 
manner that ascertains if there is a probability of duplicative recovery 
or complex apportionment.119 Further, the efficient enforcer concerns 
must be balanced with the concern of defendants keeping illegal 
profits.
III. RECENT EFFICIENT ENFORCER FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 
BENCHMARK DECISIONS
As indicated by the case law analysis above, the efficient enforcer 
rule is concerned with duplicative recovery or complex apportionment; 
problems particularly apparent in offensive pass-on cases involving a 
vertical chain of distribution. The cases involving financial products
benchmark manipulation, such as LIBOR, FOREX, and ISDAfix are not 
pass-on cases in a typical vertical chain of distribution. As explained 
in more detail below, the financial products in question have their 
price, in part, tied to a benchmark which fluctuates daily. The damages 
to each plaintiff in these cases is unique to that plaintiff depending 
upon the manipulation that occurred during the time-period that the 
plaintiff held the financial product. Overcharges are due to benchmark 
manipulation not middleman pass-on. Accordingly, there is no pass-
on in a vertical chain of distribution and no probability for duplicative 
recovery nor complex apportionment. However, there is a problem 
with allowing defendants to keep illegal profits.
A. LIBOR
1. What is LIBOR?
LIBOR is a benchmark that, in essence, estimates the cost of 
money one bank would pay to borrow unsecured funding from another 
720, 730–31 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 
481, 493 (1968). See Hovenkamp, supra note 105, at 1718. 
119 In articulating an economist’s view of an optimal efficient enforcer rule, one 
commentator opined: “The rule emerges that an “efficient enforcer” is a plaintiff 
who has low information costs in investigating alleged antitrust violations, who is 
genuinely injured by defendants' anticompetitive conduct, whose damages are easy 
for courts to calculate and who will not recover damages that another plaintiff also 
will recover.” Edgar Swift, Standing by Your Man Ray: Troubles With Antitrust 
Standing in Art Authentication Cases, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 247, 267 (2014).
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bank.120 The British Bankers Association, which administered LIBOR 
from its inception and through the relevant time period,121 requested
participating banks to submit data in response to this question, “At 
what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and 
then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior 
to 11 am?” 122 The rates were calculated by data submitted by ten 
panels of participating banks, one panel for ten major currencies, for 
fifteen different time periods on overnight loans up to twelve month 
loans.123 The data provided by participating banks on a specific panel 
was then “trimmed” with the highest and lowest 25% rates eliminated 
and the median rates used.124
2. Allegations of Manipulation in LIBOR
Plaintiffs in the LIBOR case purchased financial instruments that 
were priced based upon a negotiated amount plus or minus the 3-month 
U.S. Dollar LIBOR rate. There were four classes of plaintiffs in the 
LIBOR case with the distinction being the type of financial 
instruments they purchased. The first class of plaintiffs were the over-
the-counter (OTC) plaintiffs who allegedly purchased OTC LIBOR 
based financial products directly from defendants. 125 The OTC 
120 See generally Alvin L. Arnold, Financing: Understanding Libor, 44 NO. 6
MORTGAGE & REAL EST. EXECUTIVES REP. 6 (2008); Sharon E. Foster, LIBOR 
Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 291, 296–7
(2013); Letter from U.K. Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice to Barclays Bank PLC, at 
5–7 (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Final Notice to Barclays], available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/barclays-jun12.pdf; BANK OF ENG., TRENDS 
IN LENDING 14 (2012), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/monetary/trendsJul
y12.pdf; The Basics, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-
basics (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
121 Foster, supra note 118, at 296; Martin Wheatley, The Wheatley Review of 
LIBOR: Final Report 35 (HM Treasury, U.K., Sept. 28, 2012), available at 
http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf, at 5.
122 Foster, supra note 118 at 296; The Basics, supra note 118.
123 Foster, supra note 118, at 296; The Basics, supra note 118; see Arnold, supra
note 118, at 6 and Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 118, at 6.
124 Foster, supra note 118, at 296–97; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 118, at 
7; The Basics, supra note 118. See also Arnold, supra note 118, at 6.
125 Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Antitrust Claims at 5, In 
re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-2262NRB, 2012 
WL 12528837 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 29, 2012) (The OTC Plaintiffs allege that they 
purchased from Defendants during the Class Period various financial instruments 
that paid interest indexed to USD LIBOR. OTC Compl. ¶ 34).
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plaintiffs were held to be direct purchasers and, thus, efficient 
enforcers.126
The second class of plaintiffs were dubbed the “Exchange-Based”
plaintiffs. The Exchange Based plaintiffs allegedly traded Eurodollar 
futures and options contracts tied to LIBOR. 127 Eurodollar futures 
contracts are calculated by reference to the interest rates offered on 
Eurodollar time deposits.128 The price reflects the 3-month U.S. Dollar 
LIBOR interest rate anticipated on the settlement date of the contract. 
The prices for Eurodollar futures contracts are expressed in 
denominations of 100. From that 100 figure, the estimated 3-month 
U.S. Dollar LIBOR rate on the settlement date is subtracted resulting 
in the purchase price. For example, a Eurodollar futures price of 
$96.00 reflects an estimated settlement interest rate of 4%. If an 
investor buys 1 Eurodollar futures contract at $96.00 and price rises to 
$96.02, this corresponds to a lower implied settlement of LIBOR at 
3.98%. The buyer of the futures contract will have made $50.00. One
basis point, 0.01, is equal to $25.00 per contract, therefore a move of 
0.02 equals a change of $50.00 per contract.129
The underlying asset for Eurodollar options contracts are 
Eurodollar futures.130 Options are basically divided into call options, a 
right to buy at a specified price, or put options, a right to sell at a 
specified price.131 Usually, holders of Eurodollar call options benefit 
if interest rates fall and holders of Eurodollar put options benefit if 
interest rates rise.132 Borrowers wishing to hedge against interest rates 
rising may do so by buying a put option while lenders wishing to hedge 
interest rate drops or lock in a floor for interest rates may do so by 
126 In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. 11 MDL 
2262(NRB), 2016 WL 7378980, at app. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016).
127 Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Antitrust Claims at 5, In 
re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-2262NRB, 2012 
WL 12528837 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 29, 2012) (citing to Exch. Compl. ¶¶ 20–26 and 
221.)
128 See generally Dan Blystone, Trading Eurodollar Futures: An Introduction,
INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 6, 2018, 6:05 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/012214/introduction-trading-
eurodollar-futures.asp [https://perma.cc/9TER-TPP8] (explaining how Eurodollar 
futures are calculated).
129 Id.
130 Ian Cooper, The Mechanics of Interest Rate Options, in MANAGEMENT OF 
INTEREST RATE RISK 179, (Boris Antl ed. 1988).
131 S. Wade Hansen, Options Basics: Puts and Calls, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2006, 
10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/08/23/investools-options-ge-
in_wh_0823investools_inl.html. 
132 Cooper, supra note 128 at, 179.
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buying call options.133 Generally, options provide the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy or sell a specified amount of security, at a specified 
price within a specified time frame.134 Because the underlying asset 
are Eurodollar futures contracts, pricing tracks this market.135
The third class of plaintiffs were the Gelboim plaintiffs who owned 
debt securities 136 that paid interest tied to U.S. dollar (“USD”)
LIBOR.137 The Gelboim plaintiffs did not claim to have purchased or 
sold debt securities from defendants nor receive interest rate payments 
from defendants. 138 The debt securities were allegedly issued by 
General Electric Capital Corporation and the State of Israel.139
The amount of money an owner of a debt security expects to 
receive from the investment (“yield”) 140 includes the current fair 
market value (face value plus interest rate), the nominal value based 
upon the annual interest paid or the total of coupons and the maturity 
rate taking into account face value and future cash flows based upon
interest rates.141 Generally, the value of the debt security will increase 
or decrease based upon interest rates.142
The fourth and final class of plaintiffs were the Schwab plaintiffs 
who purchased fixed and floating rate notes from Defendants, their 
133 Id.
134 Morningstar Investing Glossary, Option, MORNINGSTAR,
http://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/option_definition_what_is.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2018). 
135 Cooper, supra note 128, at 181.
136 “A debt security refers to money borrowed that must be repaid that has a fixed 
amount, a maturity date(s), and usually a specific rate of interest . . . . Examples of 
debt securities are treasury bills, bonds and commercial paper. The borrower pays 
interest for the use of the money and pays the principal amount on a specified 
date.” Morningstar Investing Glossary, Debt Securities, MORNINGSTAR,
http://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/debt_securities_definition_what_is.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
137 Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Antitrust Claims at 5, In 
re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 430, (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 28, 2018) (11 MD 2262), 2012 WL 12528837, at *8 (citing Gelboim Compl. ¶ 
1). 
138 Id.
139 Id. (citing Gelboim Compl. ¶¶ 15–16).
140 Yield on Debt Securities and Other Investment Instruments, FINANCIALIZED,
http://www.financialized.com/Investing/yield-on-debt-securities-and-investment-
instruments (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
141 Id.
142 Id. (explaining as with all financial instruments, there are several factors that 
may affect the value of a debt security including interest rate, the state of the 
economy, the features of a bond issue, the issuer (government or corporations), 
risks (such as default) and tax considerations). 
2019] ANTITRUST EFFICIENT ENFORCER 131
subsidiaries and affiliates, and from unrelated third parties.143 To the 
extent plaintiffs purchased these notes from defendants they are direct 
purchasers and are efficient enforcers by any standard.144 To the extent 
the plaintiffs purchased these notes from subsidiaries or affiliates of 
defendants, if the defendants controlled these affiliates or subsidiaries 
plaintiffs may still be considered direct purchasers. 145 However, 
purchases of these notes by plaintiffs from unrelated third parties 
would create an indirect purchaser, efficient enforcer issue.
Fixed rate notes have a fixed interest rate for the entire term of the 
note. While this fixed rate reduces risk based upon interest rates going 
down,146 they are risky if interest rates go up resulting in reduced 
income flows relative to income flows from notes paying the higher 
interest rates.
A floating-rate notes typically make quarterly payments that rise 
or fall with interest rates. The interest rates are tied to a benchmark 
such as LIBOR.147 These notes are often investments in a corporation's 
debt. Along with brokers, some corporations sell their floater notes 
143 Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Antitrust Claims at 6, In 
re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 430, (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 28, 2018) (11 MD 2262), 2012 WL 12528837, at *8.
144 In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 11 MDL 2262, 2016 WL 
7378980 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018).
145 Hovenkamp, supra note 106, at 1719 (first citing dicta in Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n. 16 (1977), and In re Chicken Antitrust Litig. Am. 
Poultry, 669 F.2d 228, 239 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining some courts, moreover, 
have held that Illinois Brick will not bar an indirect-purchaser action if the violator 
owned or somehow controlled the dealer); then citing California v. ARC America 
Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989) (explaining another exception to the efficient 
enforcer indirect purchaser rule is when plaintiffs are seeking an injunction); then 
citing Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1197 (1985); Fontana Aviation Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 
(7th Cir. 1980); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 
1295 (D. Md.), modified on other grounds, 541 F. Supp. 62 (D. Md. 1981) aff'd sub 
nom. Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distribs., Inc., 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 
1983) (explaining that additionally, some courts have held that a conspiracy 
involving the seller and direct purchaser may provide an exception for an indirect 
purchaser). The control, injunction and conspiracy exceptions are beyond the scope 
of this paper.
146 Fixed-Rate Bonds, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fixedrate-bond.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 
2018).
147 Floating-Rate Securities, PROJECT: INVESTED,
http://www.investinginbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=9&subcatid=52&id=275
(last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
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directly to investors.148
3. The Second Circuit’s LIBOR Decision in Gelboim and on 
Remand in LIBOR
The issue on appeal in Gelboim was whether plaintiffs established 
an antitrust injury. Efficient enforcement was not before the court;
however, it was discussed in dicta.149 It is important to keep in mind 
that the Gelboim case does not involve the typical indirect-purchaser 
in an overcharge case nor was it a case involving a pass-on in a vertical 
chain of distribution. 150 The indirect plaintiffs in Gelboim were
seeking damages caused by the artificial suppression of the LIBOR
benchmark rate which reduced their interest income flows. 
Accordingly, the application of the Illinois Brick decision precluding
recovery by indirect purchasers for overcharges is inapplicable. 151
Indeed, all the authorities cited by the Second Circuit dealt with pass-
on overcharges in a typical vertical chain of distribution scenario152
which is distinguishable from a financial product benchmark case. 
Considering the detailed efficient enforcer factor discussion in the 
Gelboim decision and the court’s remarks that there are features of this 
case that make it like no other153 this section discusses the court’s 
concerns regarding efficient enforcer in the context of the Gelboim
unique facts.
While the Second Circuit in Gelboim held that the pleadings were 
sufficient to establish antitrust injury, the court expressed, in dicta,
concern regarding the second standing prong in the Second Circuit of 
efficient enforcer.154 The efficient enforcer factors articulated in the 
Gelboim opinion are slightly different from previous Second Circuit 
efficient enforcer decisions although they do reflect the similar
concerns. In Gelboim the efficient enforcer factors were articulated as:
(1) the “directness or indirectness of the asserted injury,” which 
148 Constance Gustke, Floating-Rate Securities: Timely but Risky, BANKRATE (Mar. 
4, 2014), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/floating-rate-securities.aspx.
149 Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 778 (2d Cir. 2016).
150 Id. at 764.
151 See Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 373–
374 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of 
Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. REV. 751, 753, 777 (1980)).
152 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 772–75.
153 Id. at 777.
154 Id. at 772, 777–80.
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requires evaluation of the “chain of causation” linking 
appellants’ asserted injury and the Banks’ alleged price-fixing;
(2) the “existence of more direct victims of the alleged 
conspiracy”; (3) the extent to which appellants’ damages claim 
is “highly speculative”; and (4) the importance of avoiding 
“either the risk of duplicate recoveries on the one hand, or the 
danger of complex apportionment of damages on the other.”155
Although the court in Gelboim addressed all four efficient enforcer 
factors, it seems most concerned with the first factor, directness or 
indirectness of the asserted injury, in terms of the umbrella effect of a 
cartel (which is a remoteness concern), over-deterrence, and the fourth 
factor of duplicative damages.
a. The “Directness or Indirectness of the Asserted 
Injury,” Which Requires Evaluation of the “Chain 
of Causation” Linking Appellants’ Asserted Injury 
and the Banks’ Alleged Price-Fixing
In addressing the direct/indirect factor, the courts in Gelboim and 
LIBOR discuss concerns about the umbrella theory in terms of 
intervening market factors causing plaintiffs’ injuries breaking the 
chain of causation and concerns about ruinous liability for defendants.
As discussed below, the umbrella theory regarding conduct by non-
cartel entities and the ripple effect is not applicable in Gelboim and 
LIBOR. Further, concerns about ruinous liability seems to turn the 
balance of not allowing defendants to keep illegal profits on its head. 
Ruinous liability is a collateral consequence concerns not proper for 
efficient enforcer analysis nor is it proper under the rule of law.
i. Umbrella Theory
For the direct/indirect factor the Gelboim court expressed concern 
regarding the linkage between indirect appellants’ injury and the 
appellees’ alleged price-fixing in the relevant market.156 The indirect 
appellants’ injury is artificially high settlement prices of Eurodollar 
futures contracts and reduced interest income on debt securities which 
155 Id. at 778; In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, 2016 
WL 7378980 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018).
156 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 772, 777–780.
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they held.157 The main concern was that some appellants did not deal 
directly with the appellees.158
Most cases express a concern about indirect purchasers in the 
context of indirect purchasers asserting an overcharge due to pass-on
in a vertical chain of distribution in the offensive context. That is not 
the case under the Gelboim facts. Rather, the court discusses 
“umbrella” standing concerns articulated in a Third Circuit district 
court opinion in terms of indirect purchasers.159 The umbrella scenario 
involves increased speculation of damages where plaintiffs’ injuries 
are the result of defendants’ conduct causing a competitor/non-cartel 
member to react in a similar fashion (usually raising prices) or where 
plaintiffs’ injuries are a result of the ripple effect through the economy 
because of defendants’ conduct.160 Neither scenario occurred in the 
LIBOR case.
In discussing the umbrella scenario, the court in Gelboim cites In 
re Processed Egg Products. Antitrust Litigation161 which cites to Mid–
West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc.,162 where the 
court found that plaintiffs purchasing from a non-conspirator lacked 
standing to recover relying on Illinois Brick.163 In re Processed Egg 
Products Antitrust Litigation. and Mid–West Paper Products Co. v. 
Continental Group, Inc. both involved plaintiffs’ injuries that were the 
result of defendants’ conduct causing a competitor/non-cartel member 
to raise prices. Both cases involved the complex apportionment factors
in a pass-on, vertical chain of distribution. 164 While plaintiffs’ in 
Gelboim in some cases did purchase indirectly from non-cartel 
157 Id. at 768.
158 Id. at 778.
159 Id. at 778 (citing In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08 MD 2002,
2015 WL 5544524, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2015), overruled by In re Processed 
Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2015)).
160 William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1445, 1465–67 (1985).
161 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 778 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing In re Processed Egg Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., No. 08 MD 2002, 2015 WL 5544524, at *14 (E.D. Pa. 2015),
overruled by In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 10, 2015)). 
162 In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08 MD 2002, 2015 WL 
5544524 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Grp., Inc.,
596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979)), overruled by In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2015).
163 Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. Cont’l Grp., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
164 In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124, 143–44 (E.D. Pa. 
2015) (citing Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Grp. Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 584 (3d 
Cir. 1979)).
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members, their damages were not caused by non-cartel members 
overcharge to plaintiffs’. Rather, plaintiffs’ damages were caused by 
defendants’ manipulation of the LIBOR benchmark which effected 
price regardless of what price non-cartel members charged plaintiffs.
Additionally, the court cites to a law review article by William H. 
Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations165 (Page) which 
discusses monopolistic overcharge in price-fixing cases and output 
restrictions outside of the financial products context. Specifically,
regarding the umbrella scenario Page asserts:
When a cartel controls less than the entire market, the 
competitive nonmembers will increase output until their 
marginal cost equals the cartel price. Thus, their output reduces 
the market power of the cartel by increasing the elasticity of 
the cartel's residual demand function. At the same time, they 
will recover an ‘overcharge’ from their consumers by selling at 
the cartel price. This has been termed the umbrella effect of a 
cartel.166
According to the above analysis, the antitrust injury comes from the 
overcharge by nonmember competitors.167 It is not even a pass-on and, 
thus, even more remote than the pass-on situation but certainly 
causally connected to cartel pricing.168 Again, as mentioned above, in 
Gelboim the damages were caused by defendants’ (alleged cartel 
members) benchmark manipulation conduct which has, by the 
benchmark’s intended purpose, a direct impact on what the market 
charges. In essence, there is no independent pricing decision by 
competitive nonmembers.
Additional umbrella effects discussed by Page include:
As cartel members reduce their output, they will minimize their 
variable costs by reducing their purchases of raw materials, 
laying off employees, and so forth. These actions will certainly
cause harm to the suppliers and employees of the cartel 
members. Do these harms constitute antitrust injury? The issue 
is troublesome because these harms are unquestionably caused 
165 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 778 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing William H. Page, The Scope of 
Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1465–74 (1985)).
166 Page, supra note 159, at 1465.
167 Id. at 1465–67.
168 Id. at 1467.
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by the output restriction and therefore meet the standard of 
proportional variation. On the other hand, the injury to 
suppliers and employees is offset by cost savings to members 
of the cartel . . . to allow suppliers and employees to recover 
would represent overdeterrence.169
The above example is the ripple effect aspect of the umbrella scenario.
Again, this has nothing to do with the facts in Gelboim.
The Gelboim court discusses a split in authority on the umbrella 
theory170 citing U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co.171 and In re Beef 
Industry Antitrust Litigation172 opposing the umbrella theory and Mid-
West Paper Products. Co. v. Continental Group Inc.173 taking a more 
favorable view of the umbrella theory. In U.S. Gypsum the court
discussed the umbrella theory concept of overcharges paid by indirect 
purchasers, finding no efficient enforcer problem as there was no risk 
of duplicative recovery. In In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation
plaintiffs, cattlemen, ranchers, and feeders, alleged that defendants, 
retail food chains, a wholesale grocer, the retail chains' national trade 
association, and a beef industry price reporting publication, combined 
to fix artificially low prices for beef purchased from slaughterhouses 
and meat packers. This, in turn, reduced the prices which the plaintiffs 
received in selling their cattle to the packers and slaughterhouses.
Under the umbrella scenario, this was a case of ripple effect in the 
economy. The court in In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation rejected 
defendants’ argument that damages would be too complex to ascertain
as a matter of law in a summary judgment proceeding. The court 
specifically rejected the umbrella theory.174 The pro-umbrella scenario 
case cited by the Gelboim court, Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. 
Continental Group. Inc., involved supermarket and retail grocery store 
plaintiffs alleging that defendants, manufacture of consumer bags, 
were price fixing. This was a pass-on case under the ripple effect 
scenario.175
169 Id. at 1467.
170 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 778–79.
171 Id. at 778 (citing U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 
2003)). 
172 Id. (citing In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1171 (5th Cir. 
1979)).
173 Id. at 778–79 (citing Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Grp. Inc., 596 F.2d 
573, 580–87 (3d Cir. 1979)).
174 In re Beef, 600 F.2d at 1166.
175 Mid-West Paper Prods. Co., 596 F.2d at 580–83.
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The umbrella theory is not relevant to the Gelboim case. The 
critical distinction being the fact that there is no intervening cause or 
persons between plaintiffs’ damages and defendants’ conduct. LIBOR 
is an interest rate benchmark that is hardwired into the investment
products purchased by plaintiffs. When defendants fixed the relevant 
LIBOR rate artificially low plaintiffs were damaged. Plaintiffs are not 
alleging an injury from defendants’ competitor/non-cartel members. 
The injuries are a direct result of defendants’ conduct, not some 
remote, unanticipated conduct by third parties 176 nor are plaintiffs’ 
injuries merely the ripple effects of some remote antitrust conduct.
Granted, the ripple effects to the economy by defendants’ alleged 
conduct is vast and could include a pensioner who gets reduced income 
by defendants’ conduct resulting in an inability to help a child or 
grandchild with college tuition resulting in reduced income for that 
child or grandchild. But that is not what we are dealing with here.177
The court in LIBOR applied the umbrella scenario as incorrectly 
articulated by the appellate court in Gelboim:
Plaintiffs who purchased products from non-defendants but 
allege that defendants' actions raised their prices are called 
“umbrella purchasers.” Some courts reject standing of 
umbrella purchasers because “‘significant intervening 
causative factors,’ most notably, the ‘independent pricing 
decisions of non-conspiring retailers,’” attenuate the causal 
connection between the violation and the injury. In such 
circumstances, “the defendants secured no illegal benefit at 
[the plaintiffs'] expense,” . . . Although “[t]he antitrust laws do 
not require a plaintiff to have purchased directly from a 
defendant in order to have antitrust standing,” . . . In this case, 
we are persuaded to draw a line between plaintiffs who 
transacted directly with defendants and those who did not. A 
plaintiff and a third party could, and did, easily incorporate
LIBOR into a financial transaction without any action by 
176 See, e.g., Garabet v. Autonomous Techs. Corp., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (C.D. Cal. 
2000).
177 It is doubtful that the Second Circuit’s citation to this article including this 
scenario is an indication that the umbrella effect concern in Gelboim is broader 
than the indirect purchaser concern. The rest of the article focuses on different 
antitrust injuries, such as lost profits as being different from overcharges and how 
the former may not be the type of injury antitrust laws were intended to prevent and 
harm to efficiency through conduct such as predatory pricing and boycotts which is 
irrelevant in the context of the Gelboim case. See Page, supra note 159, at 1470–79.
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defendants whatsoever. Their independent decision to do so 
breaks the chain of causation between defendants' actions and 
a plaintiff's injury . . . plaintiffs who did not purchase directly 
from defendants continue to face the same hurdle: they made 
their own decisions to incorporate LIBOR into their 
transactions, over which defendants had no control, in which 
defendants had no input, and from which defendants did not 
profit . . . the Bondholder plaintiffs lack antitrust standing, and 
their antitrust claims are dismissed.178
This analysis is not an overcharge by nonmember competitor nor a 
ripple effect umbrella analysis. Rather, it assumes, incorrectly, that 
plaintiffs had a choice, and the bargaining power to affect that choice, 
regarding what benchmark to select as part of the price equation. The 
economic reality was that LIBOR benchmarks controlled 
approximately 75% of the global market for interest rate financial 
products during the relevant time period.179 Further, as a practical 
matter, some benchmark had to be used to estimate price.
Financial markets are immense and complex rendering a 
traditional concept of price meaningless for many of these markets.180
Rather than gathering all the data and digesting it for purposes of 
computing a particular price, such as interest rates a, decisional theory 
approach is applied where a sample of data is utilized to arrive at an 
estimate of an average price. These sampling summaries are price
benchmarks. 181 Price benchmarks, such as LIBOR, became a
mechanism to control prices once they become legally integrated in a 
contract as a pricing mechanism.182
In financial markets, actual price, what the underlying asset sold 
for, is irrelevant in most instances because the legal price reference in 
contracts for purposes of buying, selling and setting price are 
178 In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 7378980 at *15–
16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016) (citation omitted); See In re Platinum and Palladium 
Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 1169626 at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017) (finding
plaintiffs were not an efficient enforcer under the umbrella theory).
179 Foster, supra note 119, at 298.
180 Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 217 (2015).
181 Id. at 225.
182 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Indices used as Benchmarks in Financial Instruments and Financial Contracts at 2, 
COM (2013) 641 final (Sept. 18, 2013) (benchmarks control price); Id. at 11 
(pricing in many contracts and for financial instruments are based on benchmarks); 
Verstein, supra note 179, at 217.
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benchmarks. 183 Benchmarks are critical for a properly functioning 
market.184 Leading benchmarks, such as LIBOR, were used as a matter 
of course not as a matter of choice.185
ii. Collateral Consequences
In discussing the first efficient enforcer factor, causation, the court 
in Gelboim opined:
Requiring the Banks to pay treble damages to every plaintiff 
who ended up on the wrong side of an independent LIBOR
denominated derivative swap would, if appellants allegations 
were proved at trial, not only bankrupt 16 of the world’s most 
important financial institutions, but also vastly extend the 
potential scope of antitrust liability in myriad markets where 
derivative instruments have proliferated.186
The court in LIBOR followed this rationale: 
“[P]ermitting recovery in such a transaction ‘could subject 
antitrust violators to potentially ruinous liabilities, well in 
excess of their illegally-earned profits.’”187
Although articulated as a causation factor, it is difficult to discern 
what, if anything, bankrupting 16 of the world’s most important 
financial institutions or ruinous liabilities has to do with causation.
183 Verstein, supra note 179, at 260.
184 Id. at 226, 231; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
CFTC Orders Five Banks to Pay Over $1.4 Billion in Penalties for Attempted 
Manipulation of Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates (Nov. 12, 2014), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7056-14 (“Aitan Goelman, the 
CFTC’s Director of Enforcement, stated: ‘The setting of a benchmark rate is not 
simply another opportunity for banks to earn a profit. Countless individuals and 
companies around the world rely on these rates to settle financial contracts, and this 
reliance is premised on faith in the fundamental integrity of these benchmarks. The 
market only works if people have confidence that the process of setting these 
benchmarks is fair, not corrupted by manipulation by some of the biggest banks in 
the world.’”). 
185 See Verstein, supra note 179, at 224–25, 236.
186 Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 779 (2d Cir. 2016). 
187 In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MDL 2262 NRB, 
2016 WL 7378980 at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016) (citing Mid-West Paper Prods. 
Co. v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 586 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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Rather, it appears that the court is concerned with the collateral 
consequences of an antitrust verdict against defendants.188
Efficient enforcer factors focus on duplicative recovery and 
complex apportionment.189 The court’s opinion regarding collateral 
consequences attempts to tie in the “directness or indirectness of the 
asserted injury” and “vastly extend the potential scope of antitrust 
liability.”190 This rational is dubious at best. The bankruptcy of 16 of 
the world’s most important financial institutions or ruinous liability
has nothing to do with duplicative recovery or complex apportionment
which is what indirectness is supposed to address.191 Further, would 
courts find that the bankruptcy of a non-systemic financial institution 
causes the same concern and analysis? If so, proof of potential 
bankruptcy would effectively bar civil antitrust actions against 
defendants. If not, this is a serious rule of law problem as it causes 
disparate treatment.192
b. The “Existence of More Direct Victims of the 
Alleged Conspiracy”
Here, the Gelboim court again focuses on the direct/indirect 
purchaser problem. The court seems to conclude that appellants, 
consumers, who were not direct purchasers are injured in the same 
manner as consumers who may be direct purchasers:
Implicit in the inquiry is recognition that not every victim of an 
antitrust violation needs to be compensated under the antitrust 
188 Generally, collateral consequences have been understood in terms of 
repercussions to individuals from a criminal conviction. Sharon E. Foster, Too Big 
to Prosecute: Collateral Consequences, Systematic Institutions and the Rule of 
Law, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 655, 662 (2015). As used here, it includes 
repercussions to systemic financial service institutions due to civil actions.
189 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 543–45 (1983); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474–75
(1982); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730–35 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. 
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968). 
190 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 778–79.
191 Id. at 779.
192 Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Prosecute: Collateral Consequences, Systemic 
Institutions and the Rule of Law, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 655, 674–85 (2015). 
As a practical matter, allowing the civil antitrust action in these cases have not 
resulted in bankruptcies; rather, it has resulted in settlement providing the plaintiffs 
with some restitution. Gregory Scopino, Expanding the Reach of the Commodity 
Exchange Act's Antitrust Considerations, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573, 670 tbl.12 
(2016) (a useful table of settlements in antitrust benchmark cases). 
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laws in order for the antitrust laws to be efficiently enforced. 
Moreover, one peculiar feature of this case is that remote 
victims (who acquired LIBOR based instruments from any of
thousands of non defendant banks) would be injured to the 
same extent and in the same way as direct customers of the
Banks. The bondholders, for example, purchased their bonds 
from other sources. Crediting the allegations of the complaints, 
an artificial depression in LIBOR would injure anyone who 
bought bank debt pegged to LIBOR from any bank anywhere. 
So, in this case directness may have diminished weight.193
The court in LIBOR agreed with this conclusion:
The Second Circuit expressly recognized that even though 
“appellants allege status as consumers,” in this case “directness 
may have diminished weight” because “one peculiar feature of 
this case is that remote victims (who acquired LIBOR-based 
instruments from any of thousands of non-defendant banks) 
would be injured to the same extent and in the same way as 
direct customers of the Banks.”194
While this may be true as both will incur income flow loss due to 
suppressed LIBOR rates, it ignores the rationale behind the efficient 
enforcer rule which is to avoid duplicative damages or complex 
apportionment. Under the facts in the LIBOR case, each consumer has 
his or her own, unique damages depending upon the financial 
instruments bought, the quantity held and the time period. In short, 
there is no overlapping ownership of the same financial instrument so 
there is no duplicative recovery nor complex apportionment.
c. The Extent to Which Appellants’ Damages Claim is
“Highly Speculative”
The Gelboim court expresses concern that the damages in LIBOR
may prove to be highly speculative.195 The “speculative” aspect of the
calculation is how much the defendants manipulated LIBOR for the 
time period in question. The typical financial instrument invested in 
for income flow from the interest rate would provide the interest 
193 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 779.
194 Id.; see also In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MDL 
2262 NRB, 2016 WL 7378980 at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016).
195 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 779–80.
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income determined as of a specified settlement date. For example, an 
investor investing in debt instruments may have quarterly settlement 
dates specified for March, 31st, June 30th, September 30th and 
December 31st. These interest rates may be influenced by many market 
factors including market manipulation. But this “speculation” is 
present for both direct and indirect purchasers.196 It is not a duplicative 
recovery nor complex apportionment problem. Accordingly, it is not 
an efficient enforcer issue; rather, it is a problem of proof.
The court in LIBOR agreed that this element was a problem of 
proof issue regarding non-negotiated transactions such as the 
bondholder plaintiffs. 197 As for swapholders, the court in LIBOR
stated:
[S]wapholders are in a position similar to bondholders. 
Plaintiffs who entered into swaps before the suppression period 
may recover for suppressed payments relative to but-for 
LIBOR. And plaintiffs who entered into swaps during the 
suppression period may recover for any super-suppressed 
payments, netted against any less-suppressed payments.198
Regarding the Exchange-Based plaintiffs, the LIBOR court found:
The mathematical relationship between LIBOR and the 
settlement price of Eurodollar futures contracts does not 
address the relationship, if any, between LIBOR and the 
trading price of Eurodollar futures contracts (that is, the price 
at which Eurodollar futures contracts were bought and sold 
prior to settlement). The trading price reflects the market's 
prediction for what the price will be at settlement, which could 
be years away—not what LIBOR is at the present moment.
. . .
The only Exchange-Based plaintiffs with a non-speculative 
theory are those who, before the suppression period started, 
shorted contracts that were held to settlement during the 
suppression period.199
Here, speculative damages are, again, as a problem of proof not, as the 
196 See Jay L. Himes, When Caught with Your Hand in the Cookie Jar . . . Argue 
Standing, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 187, 203–04 (2009).
197 In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MDL 2262 NRB, 
2016 WL 7378980 at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016).
198 Id. at *20.
199 Id. at *21, *23.
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court seems to indicate, an efficient enforcer problem as there is no 
discussion of duplicative recovery or the probability of complex 
apportionment of damages due to potential multiple victims in a 
vertical chain of distribution.
d. The Importance of Avoiding “Either the Risk of 
Duplicate Recoveries on the One Hand, or the 
Danger of Complex Apportionment of Damages on 
the Other”
The main concern in the Gelboim court’s opinion under the 
heading of “Duplicative Recovery and Complex Damage 
Apportionment” seems to be governmental and regulatory 
investigations which may seek damages, fines, injunction or 
disgorgement and the numerous suits relating to the alleged LIBOR 
manipulation. The question here is – are the damages sought 
duplicative of the damages, fines, injunction or disgorgement sought 
by governments or others in numerous suits? If there is duplication, 
there would be a need to apportion, which is the complication the 
efficient enforcer is intended to avoid. Further, if there is such 
duplication it is doubtful appellants suit is needed to vindicate the 
Sherman Act. 200
As of 2015, approximately $9 billion in fines worldwide have been 
assessed.201 However, it appears most, if not all of the fines collected 
do not go to victims. For example, section 12(b) of Barclays 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Plea Agreement states, “In light of the 
availability of civil causes of action, which potentially provide for a 
recovery of a multiple of actual damages, the Recommended Sentence 
does not provide for a restitution order for the offense charged in the
Information.” 202
The DOJ and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) have 
indicated the fines go to the U.S. Treasury. 203 Additionally, in the 
United Kingdom, fines collected from financial service institutions go 
200 Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 780.
201 Jonathan Stempel, Big Banks Lose as U.S. Appeals Court Revives Libor 
Lawsuits, 22 NO. 2 WESTLAW J. BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 8 (June 13, 2016).
202 Plea Agreement at 10, United States of America v. Barclays, PLC, No. 
3:15CR77 (D. Conn. May 19, 2015), available at
https://www.justice.gov/file/440481/download.
203 Lynn Stuart Parramore, When Giant Banks Pay Fines, Where Does the Money 
Go? Does It Stop Crime?, ALTERNET (October 8, 2013, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.alternet.org/economy/bank-fines-and-crime.
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to the treasury.204
Addressing this fourth factor, the court in LIBOR held:
Under this factor courts are traditionally concerned with the 
prospect of different groups of plaintiffs attempting to recover 
for the same exact injury, id., which plaintiffs do not do here.205
. . .
Clearly, the Second Circuit in Gelboim was concerned with the 
scope of government recovery, as “the ramified consequences 
are beyond conception.” 823 F.3d at 780. As of now, there has 
been no showing that certain plaintiffs have been made whole 
through the receipt of restitution payments made to 
governments; if such a showing is made in the future, we will 
take the steps necessary to avoid duplicative recovery. 
Moreover, defendants suggest no substitute avenue of recovery 
for plaintiffs who transacted with a panel-bank defendant that 
is not under government investigation.206
Thus, the court in LIBOR did not see a problem with duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment absent evidence that plaintiffs 
received restitution payments.
B. FOREX
1. What is FOREX?
The FOREX case involved the manipulation of foreign exchange 
(FX) benchmark rates.207 FX benchmark rates are used to price certain 
foreign exchange financial transactions including foreign exchange 
204 Richard Anderson, Bank Fines Go to Good Causes After Rule Change, BBC
NEWS, (December 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25214567.
205 In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MDL 2262 NRB, 
2016 WL 7378980, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016) (citation omitted).
206 Id.
207 In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F.Supp.3d 581, 585 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) [hereinafter FOREX].
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swaps, 208 cross currency swaps, 209 spot transactions, 210 futures, 211
options, 212 forwards 213 and other derivatives. 214 In general, FX 
benchmark rates are set based upon actual trades (bids and offers 
during the “fix period” (a one minute window).215 The benchmark rate 
is determined by calculating the bid-offer spread based upon the fix 
period information and calculating a median which determines the 
rate.216
208 “[S]waps involve the sale or purchase of a currency on one date and the 
offsetting purchase or sale . . . on a future date . . . .” MARC LEVINSON, GUIDE TO 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 16 (4th ed. 2005).
209 “Currency swaps are an essential financial instrument utilized by banks, 
multinational corporations and institutional investors.” Nick K. Lioudis, Currency 
Swap Basics, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 3, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/11/introduction-currency-swaps.asp.
“A currency swap . . . involves the exchange of interest and sometimes of principal 
in one currency for the same in another currency.” Currency Swap, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/currencyswap.asp.
210 The spot FOREX market is a global wholesale financial market where 
currencies are traded in pairs such as the Euro/U.S. Dollar. See Press Release, FCA 
Fines Five Banks £ 1.1 Billion for FX Failings and Announces Industry-wide 
Remediation Programme, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-five-banks-for-fx-failings. Currencies for 
immediate delivery, within two days or less after the trade is agreed, are traded on 
the spot market. For example, a tourist’s purchase of foreign currency or a firm’s 
decision immediately to convert the receipts from an export sale are spot market 
transactions. See LEVINSON, supra note 206, at 15. 
211 The Forex futures market allows the lock in of an exchange rate at a set future 
date through a futures contract. A futures contract for foreign currency, in effect, 
guarantees an exchange rate, thus reducing currency fluctuation risks. See 
LEVINSON, supra note 206, at 15–16.
212 The Forex options market give the option holder the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy (“call”) or sell (“put”) a specified amount of foreign currency or 
foreign-currency futures at a specified price (the “strike rate”) during a certain 
period of time. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FINAL NOTICE TO BARCLAYS BANK PLC
(May 20, 2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/barclays-bank-
plc-may-15.pdf. The buyer of an option pays the seller a premium for the right to 
buy at the strike rate. Like futures contracts, options are not traded on organized 
exchanges. See LEVINSON, supra note 205, at 16. Option contracts are leveraged, 
meaning that investors can make large bets on exchange rate fluctuations with 
relatively little money upfront. Id. at 18. 
213 Forward contracts are similar to future contracts but are between a dealer and 
the dealer’s customer and are more flexible in the length of time. See LEVINSON,
supra note 205 at 16.
214 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-04, 2014 WL 6068387, at 2 (Nov. 
11, 2014).
215 Id. at 4.
216 Id. 
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2. Allegations of Manipulation
The manipulation involved FX traders at defendant banks 
coordinating information by disclosing confidential customer 
information, altering trading positions and agreeing on trading 
strategies to manipulate the FX benchmark rates to their mutual 
advantage:217
For example, in one of the chat rooms, if a trader determined 
that he had fix orders in the opposite direction to the chat room 
group’s overall net fixing position approaching the fixing 
window, that trader may have transacted before the fix period 
with traders outside the private chat room, a practice known by 
market participants as “netting off,” rather than transact with 
other traders within the chat room. In certain cases, the goal of 
this trading strategy was to maintain the volume of orders held 
by chat room members in the direction favored by the majority 
of the private chat room members and limit orders being 
executed in the opposite direction during the fix window.218
FOREX involved plaintiffs who transacted FX spot and 
outright forward transactions priced at or by the fix directly 
with some of the defendants.219 It was alleged by plaintiffs that 
defendants manipulated the FX benchmark rates through the 
use of one of three strategies:
• “Front running” or “trading ahead”—Defendants traded their 
own proprietary positions before executing their customers' 
large market-moving trades so that Defendants could take 
positions to their benefit and “to the detriment of the 
customer.”
• “Banging the close”—Because the calculation of the Fix does 
not weight the trades by amount traded and takes into account 
only the number of trades in any currency pair, traders 
conspired to impact the Fix by engaging in more trades. To this 
end, traders broke up larger orders into smaller amounts and 
217 Id. at 2.
218 Id. at 6–7.
219 In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F.Supp.3d 581, 586 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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concentrated the trades in the minutes before and after the 
Fixing Window to affect the Fix.
• “Painting the screen”—Defendants' traders placed fake orders 
with other Defendants to create the illusion of trading activity 
in a given direction to move rates prior to the Fixing Window. 
These trades were not actually executed.220
3. The District Court’s Decision in FOREX
In holding that plaintiffs were efficient enforcers under the 
Associated Gen. standards, the FOREX court noted that the 
manipulation of the FX benchmark rates in FOREX was 
distinguishable from the Gelboim/ LIBOR case:
Gelboim's analysis of the efficient enforcer factors may be 
particularly salient here because the plaintiffs in Gelboim and 
in this case both allege that large banks manipulated 
benchmark rates that affected the prices of financial 
instruments. As explained below, because of the factual 
differences between the two cases, the efficient enforcer 
analysis here is less challenging than in Gelboim.221
The primary difference was the fact that the FOREX plaintiffs either 
dealt directly with defendants222 or had the same effect as if they dealt 
directly with defendants due to defendants control of market share.223
Additionally, unlike LIBOR, in the FOREX case the whole price (bid 
and offer) was manipulated rather than a component of the price as in 
LIBOR.224 Thus, the court found that the risk of duplicative recovery 
and complex apportionment did not exist. However, this appears to be 
a distinction without a difference as both LIBOR and FOREX involved
price manipulation through benchmark manipulation that did not 
create duplicative recovery or complex apportionment.
C. ISDAfix
220 Id. at 587–88.
221 In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 13 Civ. 7789, 2016 WL 
5108131, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016).
222 Id. (as to OTC Plaintiffs). 
223 Id. at *9 (as to Exchange Class Plaintiffs, market share was indicated to be over 
90%).
224 Id. at *8.
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1. What is the ISDAfix?
The ISDAfix is an interest rate benchmark, issued in several 
currencies, used to price interest rate swaps.225 For example, one party 
may hold a financial instrument with a fixed interest rate while another 
party holds a financial instrument with a floating interest rate. These 
parties may enter into an agreement to swap fixed/floating interest 
rates.226 A “swaption,” is an option to enter into an interest rate swap 
at a specified rate on some set future date. 227 The ISDAfix is the 
benchmark used to price these interest rate swaps.
USD ISDAfix rates and spreads are U.S. Dollar-denominated 
swaps for various maturity dates. The 11:00 a.m. USD rate is used for 
cash settlement of swaps and swaptions.228 The USD ISDAfix rate was 
set by a process that began at 11:00 am Eastern Time by capturing 
swap rates and spreads from U.S. based Swap Brokers.229 ICAP Plc,
responsible for compiling ISDAfix benchmark rates data during the 
relevant time period, would circulate to a panel of banks and financial 
institutions (collectively “banks”) a set of reference points generated 
using the captured data and data reflecting executed trades and 
executable bids and offers at 11:00 am for US Treasury securities.230
ICAP requested the banks to submit the midpoint of where it would 
offer and bid a swap to a dealer.231 Banks could accept the reference 
rate provided at 11:02 a.m., submit a different value, or take no action.
Thomson Reuters would then average the submissions resulting in the 
USD ISDAfix.232
2. Allegations of Manipulation
In ISDAfix examples of manipulation included manipulating the 
data used to determine the rate. The captured data could be 
manipulated by executing as many transactions as possible for the 
11:00 data capture in a manner to move the data up or down depending 
225 See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 175 F. Supp. 3d 44, 51 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); See also Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., CFTC No. 17-03, 2016 WL 
7429257 at *1 (2016).
226 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 50.
227 Id.
228 Goldman Sachs, 2016 WL 7429257 at *1.
229 Id. at *2; Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
230 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 51; Goldman Sachs, 2016 WL 7429257, at *2. 
231 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 51; Goldman Sachs, 2016 WL 7429257, at *2. 
232 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 51; Goldman Sachs, 2016 WL 7429257, at *2.
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on the direction sought.233 This method of manipulation, also known 
as “banging the close” required banks to share information regarding 
their trading positions.234 Additionally, false data would be provided 
or “rubber-stamping” data provided by ICAP rather than submitting 
data.235
3. District Court’s Decision in ISDAfix
In ISDAfix plaintiffs directly transacted with some of the 
defendants involved in the conspiracy.236 However, in addressing the 
efficient enforcer factors used in the Second Circuit, the court did not 
emphasize the direct/indirect factor. Rather, the court held:
Defendants focus their argument on that factor, arguing that 
there is another class of antitrust plaintiffs that would be more 
“efficient enforcers”— [the second factor – “the existence of 
an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would 
normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in 
antitrust enforcement.”] namely, non-defendant banks that 
participated in the inter-dealer market. (citation omitted). But .
. . the Court has no reason to believe that the non-defendant 
banks suffered any financial injury at all from Defendants' 
manipulation of that market, and therefore cannot conclude 
that those banks could serve as a more “efficient enforcers” 
than Plaintiffs. In any event, the other three factors all favor the
conclusion that Plaintiffs are “efficient enforcers”: Plaintiffs 
have alleged that they were directly harmed by Defendants' 
anticompetitive conduct by having to pay higher prices (or 
earning lower profits) from instruments tied to ISDAfix [“(1) 
the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury], there is 
nothing particularly speculative about the injury alleged [(3) 
the speculativeness of the alleged injury], and the damages at 
issue are tied to particular transactions and contracts, obviating 
the danger of duplicative recovery [(4) the difficulty of 
identifying damages and apportioning them among direct and 
indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries].237
233 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 51; Goldman Sachs, 2016 WL 7429257, at *2–3.
234 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 51; Goldman Sachs, 2016 WL 7429257, at *10–*11.
235 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 55; Goldman Sachs, 2016 WL 7429257, at *11–*12.
236 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 60–61.
237 Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 60; see also Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of 
Am. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 3d 610, 622–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (where the court denied 
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1150
Thus, the court in ISDAfix appears to be addressing a “most efficient 
enforcer” defense rather than an indirect purchaser defense. The court 
found insufficient evidence for the “most efficient enforcer” defense 
which is troubling as it does not exclude this defense. To date, only the 
Seventh Circuit has adopted such an approach. The court in ISDAfix
does address efficient enforcer issues of duplicative recovery and 
complex apportionment, finding the risk of neither. This part of the 
opinion is important as the same logic that the damages at issue are 
tied to particular transactions is also applicable for the LIBOR and 
FOREX cases. However, the court also applies antitrust injury and 
general damage considerations, such as speculative damages without 
regard to duplicative recovery or complex apportionment. This may 
perpetuate the confusion of conflating antitrust injury and the efficient 
enforcer rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
The efficient enforcer rule in civil antitrust litigation is a standing 
requirement that denies standing for plaintiffs whose claims pose the 
probability of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment. Several 
factors have been articulated by the Supreme Court for consideration 
of the efficient enforcer rule. However, some of those factors have 
been conflated with another antitrust standing rule requiring an 
antitrust injury. This has led to confusion in the application of the 
efficient enforcer rule and the probability of false negatives in civil 
antitrust enforcement.
Courts need to focus on the application of the efficient enforcer 
factors as they apply to duplicative recovery and complex 
apportionment. These efficient enforcer issues are most likely a 
problem in pass-on cases in the typical vertical chain of distribution.
The financial products benchmark cases do not involve a pass-on in a 
typical vertical chain of distribution. While these financial products 
benchmark cases do pose problems in calculating damages they do not 
pose a threat of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment.
Accordingly, the efficient enforcer concerns are not present. Finally, 
courts should not neglect the important balancing factor in efficient 
enforcer cases; that those who violate the antitrust laws should not 
another motion to dismiss addressing the efficient enforcer issue as regards non-
interdealer vanilla swaps); see also In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 
F. Supp. 3d 430, 490–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (where the court found plaintiffs to be 
efficient enforcers relying, in part, on Alaska, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 44).
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retain the fruits of their illegality.

